
Explanation:
Option D is true. Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, "qualifying financial contracts" such as OTC derivatives and repurchase agreements are exempt from the automatic stay of bankruptcy. This safe harbor provision allows counterparties to immediately terminate their contracts and seize or liquidate collateral, which created a massive liquidity drain in the case of Lehman Brothers. Option A is incorrect; retaining cash settlement privileges relies on the clearing bank's willingness to provide intraday credit, not just the right to offset. Option B is incorrect; the flight of prime brokerage clients severely exacerbated liquidity stress (a prime brokerage "run"), as these clients pulled their free cash balances and assets, depriving the dealer of a critical funding source (rehypothecation). Option C is incorrect; a dealer would face funding problems if haircuts suddenly increase, not decrease, because higher haircuts require the dealer to post more of its own capital to finance the same assets.
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809.2. Duffie explains the similarities between a classic depositor run at a commercial bank and the failure mechanisms for dealer banks: "The relationships between a dealer bank and its derivatives counterparties, prime-brokerage clients, potential debt and equity investors, clearing bank, and other clients can change rapidly if the solvency of the dealer bank is threatened. The concepts at play are similar to those of a depositor run at a commercial bank. That is, fears over the solvency of the bank lead others to act so as to reduce their potential losses in the event of the bank’s default. Unlike insured depositors at a commercial bank, many of those with exposures to dealer banks have no default insurance, or do not wish to bear the frictional costs of involvement in the bank’s failure procedures even if they do have insurance. The key mechanisms that lead to the failure of a dealer bank are the flight of short-term creditors, the departures of prime-brokerage clients, various cash-draining actions by derivatives counterparties that are designed to lower their exposures to the dealer bank, and finally and most decisively, the loss of clearing-bank privileges."
In regard to these failure mechanisms, which of the following statements is TRUE?
A
The contractual "right to offset" guarantees that a dealer bank will retain cash settlement privileges
B
During the financial crisis, the flight (aka, exit) of prime brokerage clients paradoxically reduced the stress on major dealer banks like Morgan Stanley by reducing their balance sheets and therefore their exposure
C
A dealer bank who finances long-term assets with overnight repos (e.g., where the counterparties are money-market funds, securities borrowers, and other dealers) can experience funding liquidity problems if haircuts suddenly decrease
D
In the case of Lehman, over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contracts were exempted by law as “qualifying financial contracts” from the automatic stay at bankruptcy that holds up other creditors of a dealer, which resulted in a large post-bankruptcy drain on the defaulting dealer