
Explanation:
Firms with a high proportion of agents as clients are significantly more likely to commit fraud. This is primarily because agents, unlike principals, do not bear the full cost of a fraud. In a typical principal-agent relationship, the agent acts on behalf of the principal. However, if a fraudulent activity occurs, the principal bears the brunt of the financial loss, while the agent may not suffer to the same extent. This lack of direct financial consequence for the agent can lead to a higher propensity for fraudulent activities within firms that have a high proportion of agents as clients. This is because the agents may be more susceptible to unethical practices such as accepting gifts or kickbacks, as they do not bear the full cost of the potential fraud.
Choice A is incorrect. While it's true that agents might be willing to give kickbacks to obtain preferential treatment, this doesn't necessarily lead to an increased likelihood of fraud in firms with a high proportion of agent clients. The willingness to give kickbacks is more related to the individual ethics and integrity of the agents rather than a systemic issue within firms.
Choice B is incorrect. Although agents may not have the same level of financial knowledge as their principals, this does not directly contribute to an increased likelihood of fraud in firms with a high proportion of agent clients. In fact, less knowledgeable agents are more likely victims rather than perpetrators of fraudulent activities.
Choice D is incorrect. The structure or link between an agent’s remuneration and investment performance does not inherently increase the likelihood for fraudulent activities in firms with a high proportion of agent clients. While it could potentially create conflicts of interest if poorly structured, it doesn't directly lead to higher instances of fraud.
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Q.4856 Which of the following best explains why firms whose clients include a high proportion of agents are more likely to commit fraud?
A
Agents are more willing to give kickbacks to obtain preferential treatment from managers.
B
Agents do not have the same level of financial knowledge as their principals and are less likely to monitor manager transactions.
C
Unlike principals, agents do not bear the full cost of fraud.
D
Agents’ remuneration is not linked to investment performance.